The paper concentrates, from the critical perspective, on two general ideological themes used to support and welcome judicial activism mainly in the jurisprudence of the highest level courts of the United States and Lithuania. This task is relevant in light of the judicial activism spreading in court practices, as well as its clear embrace in the academic community of Lithuania.
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On the other hand, this critical discourse is still in the necessity of advancement, and not only because there are still critical arguments to articulate, or because the pro-activist academic position is still overwhelming. Today no one doubts that not only American, but also Lithuanian constitutional jurisprudence has undergone a period of judicial activism (especially in the period from 2002 to 2008), confirming the thoughts of Antionio Gramsci, here relied on by David
Dyzenhaus: "theory and practice are linked … because success at the theoretical level, while in no way sufficient condition for influencing or sustaining the practice, is necessary condition." 4 In some respects the other part of the thought -"inadequate reflection will eventually issue in inadequate practice" 5 -is also valid
here. As will be demonstrated in the article, the practice, if pro-activist, could be considered inadequate as related to the ethics required from the conduct of the judge. Accordingly, exactly this Lithuanian context reaffirms and necessitates the furtherance of the critique of judicial activism. Judicial activism has clearly stepped out from the classrooms of academic institutions into the court halls and started influencing the lives of all in Lithuania. Courts started "playing kings", although kings, in our contemporary political framework, they were not supposed to be; or, at least, they should, in all possible ways, avoid this mighty playground.
This paper is a continuation of the ideas and analysis of the aforementioned article of 2004. The object of the research in this paper is to expose certain motives in favour of the expansion of judicial activism that were not touched upon enough or demanded greater and more rigorous articulation in the aforementioned article.
These motives, generally, are two -the support of judicial activism by using the ideas and activities of Justice John Marshall (Part 1), and the support of judicial activism by the idea of the complexity of reality in relationship to law as text (Part 2). The second motive is thoroughly investigated by touching upon the concepts of official constitutional doctrine, legal precedent and gaps (lacunae) or inconsistencies of law, estimating the impact of judicial activism to the political framework of the state. Finally, this article suggests an alternative approach to the pro-activist position -the ethics of restrained adjudication -albeit predominantly in general terms (Part 3).
THE MARSHALLIAN CONTROVERSIES
One of the major ideological themes in support of judicial activism in Lithuania could be titled "the ideas and activities of Justice John Marshall". Therein Justice So far are words from having obvious meanings that Marshall reminds us that "such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations one single definite idea; and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense" … . , we should also have in mind that the development in this direction was the result of a political rather than a judicial process.
THE CHALLENGE OF REALITY TO THE LEGAL TEXT
As it has already been mentioned, even Marbury's ideology may support an anti-activist position due to textualism, which this case (even as a representation of a political process) is fundamentally based on. However, this kind of textualism could be criticized by different rationale, which belongs to the second general statement to which we must respond. The reasoning proceeds as follows: the reality or, otherwise, law at the behaviorist level is always much more complicated than the legal norms or, otherwise, law at the normative/textual level, and this is even more valid to the constitutional text which has the characteristic traits of ambiguity, vagueness, gaps of law and the like; therefore, court jurisprudence, and especially constitutional jurisprudence, could not avoid taking the form of precedent, the creation of law rather than interpretation of law. Not inquiring much into the problem of the intersection between the interpretation and creation of law at the moment, we should definitely accept the rather obvious thesis that courts sometimes create law, and the higher the instance of the court, the more this sometimes transforms into often. In this respect two critical ideological themes -one more historical/practical, the other more theoretical -are developed by the anti-activists.
The first theme focuses on the differences in the articulation and the conception of the judicial creation of law in two major, historically formed legal traditions. The common-law tradition is usually presented as the tradition of judicial precedents -the norms of law, created by courts; and therein the judicial creation of law is much more coherently accepted, differently from the civil-law tradition.
Therefore, when legal scholars are confronted with the attempts to introduce "more judicial precedent" into the Lithuanian legal system, one of the arguments against this tendency is that it does not correspond to the civil-law tradition, which our country belongs to. 11 This argumentation, as based on the authority of the tradition and, therefore, as any only-based-on-authority argument, does not confirm the anti-activist position (which concerns the judicial creation of law as an ultimate form of the judicial activism) in the same ways as the other theoretical argumentation.
To be certain, it would not be right to allege that the civil-law tradition is void of precedent-based adjudication. Firstly, it is very well known (and this knowledge is used in the pro-activist camp) that both traditions in the contemporary world are in the stage of convergence. The civil-law tradition is really in the necessity of "rethinking of the role of precedent" in front of the parliamentary legislation which usually lacks coherency, clarity, conceptual and terminological consistency, thus inevitably throwing judges into an interpretative turmoil with a leading suspicion that it sucks them into the domain of political activity. only to consult (we could call it a practical precedent); however, that which concerns the latter mode of the precedent-based adjudication is that both traditions in one or another form (more or less explicit) contain that. And even the commonlaw tradition, especially with a wider historical scope in mind, is more firmly based on a practical than on an official precedent conception. Until now there is a known and accepted conception that "whether a decision becomes an influential precedent depends on the wisdom of the decision and the rhetorical elegance of the opinions supporting the decision", and "if a case deviates from traditional principles of law, it will be quickly forgotten". 13 The understanding of the legal precedent as something strictly obligatory to courts (strict stare decisis), as a real declaration of law -i.e.
positivistic approach to legal precedent -is much more the product of modernity, especially starting from the 19 th century. 14 On the other hand, not inquiring more into the historical details, exactly this second characteristic of the precedent-based common-law tradition -stare decisis itself -is much more useful for the antiactivists than for the pro-activists; being a positivistic feature of the common-law tradition, it is about restraining judges, but not over-empowering them. In this respect, stare decisis is really of those good common-law habits in the anti-activist sense, and should be attended to by the anti-activists when this habit loses vigor. 15 To summarize this first ideological theme developed by anti-activists (i.e.
emphasis on the traditional divergences): even if this argumentation is used in the anti-activist camp in the civil-law countries, including Lithuania, its weaknesses should be born in mind, as well as the fact that not everything from the commonlaw tradition is impractical and unhelpful for the anti-activists.
Starting the second theme developed by the anti-activists, we should turn back to the two previously mentioned characteristics of the precedent-process, and now to the first characteristic -the creation of the precedent, which is, in other words, the judicial creation of law. The second theme focuses on this aspect of the judicial world (generally or as a characteristic trait of the common-law tradition), and is developed on a much more theoretical level than the first theme (although 13 George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 69. This condition of precedent, apparently inherited from the pre-modernity, in fact, could be detrimental to strict stare decisis, because it does not require all precedents to be followed, but only those, which have certain conditions. 14 Ibid., p. 63 ("In the more conventional Anglo-American view of stare decisis, as it emerged in the nineteenth century, the courts declare what the law is. And because their decisions are the law, they constitute precedents binding on judges and litigant who come after"); p. 69-70 ("In the last two hundred years there has been a movement in Anglo-American law to make case law more like statutory law. In the mid-eighteen century, in the writings of Blackstone, judicial decisions are treated as evidence of the law, not as the law itself. … The English positivist movement of the nineteenth century generated the idea that judicial decisions were not just evidence of the law, but conclusive on the law. Thus emerged the idea of stare decisis -the principle that precedents must be followed as binding law."). 15 Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 12: 110. In the United States it has already been observed for a long time that their political system has substantial traits of aristocratism as reflected in the activity of the courts. Judges are not democratically elected, they are appointed based on the principles and requirements of professionalism, which usually are under their own control, making lawyers similar to the closed-guild of some craftsman carefully guarding "the gates" of their profession. 16 852) ), where the Court quite obviously involved in a rather creative activity while speaking on the spheres far beyond those covered by the petition. 17 Antonin Scalia, "Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws": 7; in: A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998). In this respect Scalia takes a rather radical anti-activist approach, by alleging that although "common law should [not] be scraped away as a barnacle on the hull of democracy," nevertheless, he is "content to leave the common law, and the process of developing the common law, where it is", and go on essentially without it, as "we live in an age of legislation, and most new law is statutory law" (ibid.: 12, 13). 18 Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 12: 108-109. 
"DISAPPEARING" GAPS AND INCONSISTENCIES OF LAW
By a slight change of wording (from creation to interpretation of law), there is some other ideological sub-theme used to support the judicial activism, now mainly in the realm of the constitutional jurisprudence. This is the thesis of interpretative self-sufficiency of the constitution. 19 It is mainly based on the Kelsenian "pyramidal" which gives/provides the authority to create law; basically it is the norm of this one act; 22 it is the norm that this act of granting/recognizing of authority is happening, and, as some authors would say, that really wipes off the boundaries between the spheres of law and politics. 23 On the other hand, the norms of the Kelsenian pyramid, if we start not from Grundnorm but from the regular constitution and so on down to the bottom, do not spring out of nothing, as some self appearing phenomena. Therefore, what or maybe even who is at the top of the pyramid? That is the problem of sovereignty, which was, according to Schmitt, negated by Kelsen, and that was achieved precisely by the conception of Grundnorm. 24 But if we 19 For example, see Gediminas Mesonis, "Some Aspects of the Interpretation of the Constitution: the Possibility and Limits of Valuable (Moral) Arguments," supra note 2: 47. 20 The similarity of the Kelsenian system of norms to a pyramid is an architectural-spatial metaphor that should only help to understand the theory; there are no norms "above/higher than" other norms in exact sense of words, Kelsen himself puts word higher than in quotation marks (Hans Kelsen, The democratic role of judges is to apply that will of the people, and if that will is missing, and especially if it was exactly the will to make it missing -then they should restrain from intervention. That is not some scientific/absolute rule -it should be the part of the exactly internal point of view, of the ethics of judges. And even this ethics should leave intact the relationship to their liberalistic role -to protect humans from the possible extreme atrocities of the people by the help of the system of the human rights protection. Even this role, as a matter of logics, makes no impact on the ethics of restrained adjudication.
25 25 See Part 3. Supplementing the thesis, lawyers know well two general legal principles, which are directly related to the gaps of law, as they provide the general guidelines of judicial action in their case -(1) "what is not allowed by regulation, that is forbidden," (characteristic to the criminal/administrative law, but not entire public law), and (2) "what is not forbidden/regulated, that is allowed," (characteristic to the private law). Which principle should be valid in the case of the constitutional law? The understanding of liberalistic and humanistic foundations of the contemporary political frameworks would indicate for the priority of the second principle, which exactly points to the non-intervention of courts in the case of gaps of law/non-regulation. On the hand, "constitution without gaps" approach points to the priority of the first principle, as in the case of this principle court always has to intervene; theoretically in this case there are no legal gaps, no activity is such in relationship to which law does not function as a matter of power. Therefore, such approach could be considered as an indication of the Soviet inertia, as reflected in the corresponding hierarchical and totality-of-regulation-centered modes of thinking, when there should be no free zone in relationship to law, the latter being understood as a substratum of power, but not the foundation for the common-wealth, for the res publica, what also includes the liberation of a human, the making of some private/free zone, which is out of the reach of political-legal powers. Because, as simple as it is, it is not so (i.e. they have gaps), and there is no clear theory that would require this institutional (having in mind courts) and powerusurping appropriation. At least, which norm is higher is not at issue; rather, the questions are what the people's will is, and whether every human is protected from the possible extreme atrocities caused by this will? If some issue becomes very important to the people, they will make appropriate changes or additions to constitutions or other legal norms by the appropriate procedure; if they do not do that, then it is exactly their will not to do that, and it is not for the court to supplement that will. The only exception is the aforementioned atrocities caused by the will (or its absence) of the people (especially if done at the level of constitution), but, generally, it should be extremely exceptional case. In relationship to this we could note that the "door" to the field of politics for courts could lie at the intersection between so-called inscribed and universal human rights 26 We could only suggest in this respect that if any major Western country has some different regulation from some allegedly universal regulation (as human right or in relation to human right), the test of universality should fail. This concerns, for example, the death penalty. Lithuanian Constitution is essentially silent about the death penalty, and there is no universal acceptance that this gap infringes the human right to life (the example could be the US). USA Embassy case); however, with rather clear reluctance in doing that and, therefore, with proliferation of ambiguities in this matter. The result was sticking to the so-called modified doctrine of absolute state immunity. 28 Regretting such a situation, two scholars -Andrius Smaliukas and Yvonne
Goldammer -made this remarkably contradictory conclusion:
We can only hope that the Lithuanian Supreme Court in the future will succeed to demarcate itself from the political tensions and perform the real jurisdictional legislative function, which, in the absence of the legal enactments, is necessary in the present situation.
(italics -T.B.)
It is a rather simple contradiction to say that the Court should legislate by demarcating itself from the political tension: it is a political action to legislate on this matter. On the other hand, the position of the aforementioned authors of how the gap 30 should be filled is clear: restrictive doctrine should be chosen, and accordingly, authors are clearly doctrinally partial. As known, the borderline between academic and political pressures is not always clear. They rather seldom intermingle, and that is an especially characteristic trait of the world of lawyers and its spheres of education and profession. 31 Therefore, who could negate that the hope, and probably also the will, of the authors was not part of the same political (or, generally, outside) tension from which the Court should demarcate itself? The
Court was pressed to adopt the restrictive doctrine of state immunity. On the other hand, statutory law was either explicitly in favor of the other -absolute immunitydoctrine (i.e. the old Code) or was silent on the matter (i.e. the new Code). 27 Therefore, this example also points to the problematic aspect of the dynamic legal interpretation, i.e. when law starts contradicting to the so-called contemporary requirements/values of the society or, in other words, historical realties. If there is a gap of law, it is, in this case, formed by this process. 28 Generally see Andrius Smaliukas and Yvonne Goldammer, "The Restrictive Theory of State Immunity in Lithuania: Reality or Illusion," Baltic Yearbook of International Law 5 (2005). 29 Ibid.: 132. 30 In 2005 it was unambiguously the gap, as the new Code was silent on the matter; the situation as related to the old Code could be considered as the one when law is historically out-dated. 31 First of all, the aspect of the legal profession as the closed-guild, carefully guarding "the gates" of their profession, should be mentioned (also supra note 16). Secondly, in this concrete case the role of the professor Valentinas Mikelėnas, who at the relevant time was also the judge of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania, is exemplary. As observed by Smaliukas and Goldammer, Mikelėnas "in 1999 wrote that in the У. Stukonis v. USA Embassy case the Lithuanian Supreme Court, after having analyzed the historical aspects of the enactment of CCP Article 479, concluded that the application of the absolute State immunity principle is incompatible with the completely changed historical circumstances, thus the principle of restrictive State immunity ought to be followed instead of absolute immunity." (ibid.: 114).
As both authors show in their paper, this interpretation of the case by Mikelėnas was far from obvious. 
THE ETHICS OF RESTRAINED ADJUDICATION
We should start from the acknowledgement that the reaction to the propaganda of the judicial activism by democratic, anti-interpretativist or antiactivist radicalism is very useful for the pro-activists. In this respect Scalia's approach should still be regarded as an example of this kind of radicalism. It is not enough to slightly modify the emphasis on the requirements of democracy by some rather artificial concession to the common-law tradition by alleging that it "should
[not] be scraped away as a barnacle on the hull of democracy," 32 although probably not continued to develop in the contemporary democratic world. We could ask, why then not abandon all common law tradition, i.e. all which is already created by this tradition. Doesn't strict scientific sense require that? Is it not simply undemocratic in its entirety?
The point is that we should deviate (or, more precisely, prepare a deviation)
from democratic radicalism at a more general ideological level if we wish to institute which, although it is to be disdained, must nevertheless be the place to begin.
Despite that, it only shows that pro-activism is built/articulated on or through the opposition to logocentrism; it is constructed on the same ideological level and thus is indirectly influenced by logocentrism. Sometimes it even looks like pro-activism imputes/creates the thesis of the absolute correspondence of legal text and reality (when nobody alleges that) as the basis for the critical articulation of pro-activist ideology; speaking more metaphorically, "an enemy is rather created, and not real", but the creation of the enemy has its proper function -to form the starting point/basis for the advancement of the pro-activist ideology.
The point is that the problem, articulated either by anti-activists or proactivists, is that of a very fundamental level as concerns the margins of the field of 33 Apart from the rule of the recognition itself, the rules of change (legislation) and rules of adjudication are considered by Hart as secondary rules. 34 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2 nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 100-117. It should be born in mind that although this rule (i.e. holding to the ethics of restrained adjudication) should be rule of the internal point of view of judges, it should not be regarded as simple respect to secondary rules as rules by courts and other officials, but should be understood by judges/courts as "a public, common standard of correct judicial decision, and not as something with each judge merely obeys for his part only. Individual courts of the system though they may, on occasion, deviate from these rules [i.e. secondary rules] must, in general, be critically concerned with such deviations as lapses from standards, which are essentially common and public" (ibid., p. 115-116). The last sentence of the extract hits most exactly to the therein developed conception of the ethics of restrained adjudication. , and the latter aspect poses the real problem. However, the German tradition (not only the Soviet tradition with so-called mechanic interpretation of law!) of Auslegung (which does not correspond to interpretation) makes an attempt for the scientific (strictly logical/analytical/theoretically rationalistic) approach to the problem, when all possible answers to the posed legal problem should be extracted from the legal texts. In this respect the German tradition offers an example of anti-activist radicalism, which is based not so much on the ideology of democracy, but on the domination of logo-centrism/overscientificity/Kantian pure rationalism. As an alternative to this approach Prüm offers pragmatism, i.e. abandon "looking for eternal truth but just for viable proposals to improve the respective problematic situation" (ibid.: 208; relying on Richard Rorty, Wahrheit und Fortschritt (2000)), one of which is "to accept and to teach but not clad" and "to look for other ways to minimize the problem [of legal uncertainty]" (ibid.: 212). Namely in the same way the ethics of restrained adjudication is aimed at definitely not ignoring the problem of legal uncertainty/un-correspondence of legal text and real life (i.e. it accepts the skepticism, on which most of the ideology of pro-activism is build), and, after that, looking for another way to solve the problem -by changing the modes of reason without necessitating the other outcome of skepticism, i.e. pro-activist radicalism. , and this production of law is intrinsically related to human linguistic and rationalistic capabilities.
In resonance with this we also have the notion that law is essentially a matter of language 38 -we may call the modern legal society with the rule of law, modern democracy and protection of human rights a linguistic/rationalistic project. And, as mentioned, it is also a humanistic project, in relationship to which the ethics of adjudication should require balancing democratic and liberalistic roles of courts -to apply the will of the people as presented in the legal text (democratic role) and to protect human if that will oversteps the boundaries, delineated by the universal human rights (liberalistic role). Most contemporary constitutions inscribe/textualise those rights, as well as basic secondary rules in the Hartian sense, and that is also a part of the aforementioned project of the modern legal society as being the linguistic one. They are written not in vain, although this writtenness (as Levinson uses this word) definitely does not solve all the problems "in the battle for the rule of law" (constitutional texts contain ambiguities, inconsistencies, gaps and the like) and itself could be conceived as an evidence of the skeptical approach while designing the project.
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Nevertheless, understanding the whole project at the level of practical reason still allows for a clear articulation of the roles of institutions and powers designed 36 And, as errare humanum est, contingency and, accordingly, complicacy comes from both sidesreality and law. Not only reality is more complicated than the law as text is; the latter may be more or at least not less complicated (ambiguous, contradictory, etc.) than the reality is. 37 therein. Accordingly, the role of a court, especially as a so-called "guardian of the constitution", is to preserve some fundamental norms, to fix some fundamental humanistic system of values for future generations not to change them so easily.
The intensity of a law as projected against the contingency of reality/societal behavior is especially direct at the constitutional level, where it is still clear that even by writing the constitution men were not able to solve Rousseau's impossible task of putting the law above man. 40 However, as alleged by Martin Loughlin, basing his thoughts on Alexis de Tocqueville, there is no better solution in this situation than to appoint this impossible task to judges. Judges, as having "certain habits of order, a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connections of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to the revolutionary spirit and unreflecting passions of the multitude," 41 are best suited for this task of preserving fundamental, constitutionally inscribed values of our society, especially the human rights. But, as opposing "their aristocratic propensities to the nation's democratic instincts," 42 judges should strive to preserve, not change them.
That could only be achieved through the ethics of restrained adjudication, but not the anti-activist radicalism or pro-activist realistic/nihilistic resignation, when some "wish, that real life, with its contradictions and actualities, should conform to some a-priorical theoretical constructs", and others respond -"it does not correspond, so what? That is worse for the constructs."
43

CONCLUSIONS
1.
The American foundations of the power of judicial review and its corresponding development are based on intrinsic textualism, and are also far from being clear in relationship to the political neutrality of the process.
2.
Even if the argumentation, based on the divergence between common-law and civil-law traditions, is used in the anti-activist camp in the civil-law countries, its weaknesses should be kept in mind (i.e. its being based on the authority of the tradition, the convergence of the traditions, and the practical familiarity with the stare decisis in the civil-law tradition), and also the fact that not everything from the common-law tradition is impractical and unuseful for the anti-activists (the conception of stare decisis itself).
3. The Lithuanian system should acquire a substantial element of the aristocratic form of the government, if the judicial precedent as the judicial creation of law and as an element of the legal system would be explicitly accepted. 
